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ABSTRACT
Twenty-two collisions involving United States naval
vessels were analyzed in an attempt to discover the prin-
cipal causal factors of collisions at sea. Collisions
involving tactical evolutions, underway replenishment,
and evolutions of seamanship, such as mooring to a pier,
were excluded from the study.
Several factors including fatigue of the Officer-of-
the-Deck and material failure were adjudged not to be
significant causal factors in collisions. Various factors
including time of day, low visibility conditions, and
violations of the Rules of the Road were adjudged to be
significant causal factors. A Rules of the Road test
administered to 14 former OOD's at the Naval Postgraduate
School suggests that some naval officers have an insuffi-
cient knowledge of the Rules of the Road.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Collisions at sea cost the United States Navy lives,
material, and unfulfilled commitments. As ship units
become more costly and the size of the fleet dwindles,
collisions will become increasingly costly. A high
priority should, therefore, be given to the reduction of
occurrence of such collisions. The purpose of this thesis
is to determine some of the principal causal factors of
collisions at sea involving U.S. Naval vessels and to
propose appropriate remedial actions. The analysis of
previous collisions at sea is the primary method employed
to determine such causal factors.

II. DATA COLLECTION
Twenty-two collisions involving a U.S. Naval vessel
were chosen to be investigated in detail. Thirteen of
these were taken from Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps
investigative reports on collisions and nine were selected
from Combined Case Instructions prepared by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. No JAG report of a collision occurring
prior to 1960 was included in the data base and no incident
taken from Combined Case Instructions was selected for
utilization unless the collision was considered to be of
contemporary interest. This was done so that any causal
factors evidenced by the data would be pertinent to the
Navy of today. All combined case reports of contemporary
interest and all JAG reports of collisions which occurred
after 1 January 1960 which the author was able to process
were utilized if they did not fall into certain special
categories described below. This was done to make the
data as representative as possible. Excluded from the
data base were collisions occurring during naval tactical
evolutions, special operations (such as underway replenish-
ment), and evolutions of seamanship, such as mooring to a
pier. This was done to make the problem addressed a
manageable one
.
Hence, the issue under investigation is the causes of
collisions suffered by contemporary naval vessels not
engaged in the specific evolutions discussed above.

III. DATA EVALUATION
A. DATA EVALUATION OF A SINGLE COLLISION
Before the principal causal factors of collisions could
be identified, it was necessary to analyze the collisions
in the data base and determine the causal factors responsible
for each individual collision. A catalogue of potential
causal factors was prepared and as each collision was studied
it was determined which of the causal factors was responsible
for that particular collision. Although conclusions reached
in the JAG investigative reports and in the case studies
aided in this process, the assignment of causal factors
required the subjective judgment of the author. It should
also be remembered that conclusions reached in the JAG
investigative reports and case studies were similarly
reached in a subjective manner.
The catalogue of potential causal factors which was
prepared follows:
I. Violations of the Rules of the Road by U.S.
Naval Vessel
a. Excessive Speed in Fog
b. Failure to Meet Responsibilities of Burdened Vessel
c. Improper Utilization of Sound Signals
d. Other
II. Poor Seamanship
a. Commanding Officer Performed Unsatisfactorily.
b. Commanding Officer failed to take timely action
with inexperienced officer with the conn.
10

c. Of ficer-of - the-Deck Performed Unsatisfactorily.
d. Conning Officer (other than CO, 00D) Performed
Unsatisfactorily.
e. Navigator Performed Unsatisfactorily.
f. Executive Officer Performed Unsatisfactorily.
g. Inadequate Support and Recommending by all to CO.
h. Combat Information Center Performed Unsatisfactorily.
III. Shipboard Organization
a. Poorly Trained Bridge Watch
b. Poorly Trained Combat Information Center (CIC)
c. Poorly Trained Navigational Detail
d. Poorly Trained Low Visibility Detail
e. Poorly Trained Engineering Watch
f. Other
IV. Material Failure
a. Due to Improper Use/Operation
b. Due to Improper Maintenance
c. Due to Act of God
V. Weather
a. Sea State
b. Wind
c. Low Visibility
VI. Failure of Other Vessel to Adhere to Rules of the Road
a. Duties of Burdened/Privileged Vessel
b. Excessive Speed in Fog
c. Improper Lighting
d. Other
VII. Other
11

In addition, for each collision it was recorded whether
the collision occurred by day or night, and the time the
Officer-of-the-Deck (00D) and Commanding Officer had spent
on deck prior to collision.
B. RESULTS OF EVALUATION OF ALL COLLISIONS
The results of the analysis of all 22 data points appear
in Table I. The analysis of issues raised by the data
follows the table.
12
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1 . Material Failure
A potential cause of collision is the material
failure of some portion of a ship's mechanical or electrical
system. In the 22 cases in the data base there is but one
instance of material failure contributing to collision.
It was one of several causes contributing to collision,
and was not the primary causal factor.
In this one incident a provision storeship was
proceeding at 11 knots in fog (visibility 300 yards) . As
defined by Rule 16(a), 11 knots would here be adjudged
to be immoderate speed, especially if it were known that
other vessels were in the immediate vicinity. A contact
was plotted twice on radar and it was ascertained that the
contact would have a closest point-of -approach (CPA) of
450 yards. It was known the radar had not been function-
ing satisfactorily.
The contact then emerged from the fog and collided
with the storeship. Later it was ascertained that the radar
was indeed defective. To proceed in a thick fog at 11
knots and conclude that the probability of collision is
negligible on the basis of two ranges and bearings from
even a properly functioning radar is ill advised. Since,
in this instance, the ship's radar was suspect, the reliance
placed in the sensor was imprudent. The onus of this
collision cannot be placed on the ship's equipment but
rather on her ship handlers who did not appreciate the
equipment's limitations.
14

Material failure may be discarded as a causal
factor of any importance of the collisions in the data
base. This is not to say that equipment failure has never
been the principal cause of collision or never will be,
but rather that the probability that any collision will
be caused by material failure is exceedingly small. It
should be noted that the collisions dealt with in this
study do not include those occurring during special opera-
tions such as underway replenishment. Material failure
might well be a significant causal factor of collisions
occurring during such evolutions.
2 . Fatigue of the Of ficer-of - the-Deck
It has often been hypothesized that a principal
causal factor of collisions is an Off icer-of- the-Deck (OODj
performing his duties in an excessive state of fatigue with
a coincident degraded state of vigilence. To investigate
this factor a useful statistic to study would be the hours
spent on deck by the 00D prior to collision. This statistic
is tabulated in Table I.
To see if there is any upward trend of collision
occurrence as the 00D spends more time on watch a Chi-Square
test was utilized.
Null hypothesis: Collisions occur with equal
probability in each hour of the 00D ' s watch.
Alternate hypothesis: Collisions do not occur
with equal probability in each hour of the OOD's watch.
15

The mechanics of the test are delineated in
Appendix A.
As one would suspect from even a cursory examination
of the data, the hypothesis that collisions occur with
equal probability during the different hours of the watch
was not rejected. Indeed it appears that they occur with
remarkable uniformity with time spent on deck by the 00D.
Hence, excessive fatigue of the Officer-of-the-Deck
does not appear to be a primary causal factor in collisions.
This statement must be qualified in that hours on watch
may not be an adequate measure of 00D fatigue. A more
meaningful measure of effectiveness, however, could not
be retrieved from the data.
3 . Day and Night Collisions
It might seem plausible that collisions are more
likely to occur in the hours of darkness than in daylight
hours. From Table I, it is seen that five collisions out
of 22 occurred in daylight, while the remaining 17 occurred
in hours of darkness. The Binomial Test is utilized as
follows
:
Null hypothesis: The probability of a collision
occurring during daylight is equal to the probability of
collision occurring in the hours of darkness.
Alternate hypothesis: The probability of a
collision occurring during the hours of darkness is
greater than the probability of a collision occurring in
daylight.
16

For a sample size of 22, the probability of a
daytime collision sum equal to or less than five is .008.
Thus the null hypothesis can be rejected with a
high degree of confidence. One should also note that on
the average the hours of daylight in a day, as defined
by this author, generally are greater than the hours of
darkness. This would cause the null hypothesis to be
rejected with even less trepidation.
If indeed collisions are more likely to occur at
night than during the day, there are probably more under-
lying reasons than simply the absence of the light of the
sun. Other important causes might be a decreased lack of
vigilance or the absence of the Captain from the bridge.
To be more thorough, the preceding binomial test should
be applied with all incidents in which visibility was
reduced by fog removed from the sample. That is, it is
assumed that the presence of fog makes the distinction
between daylight and darkness an unimportant one. Now
13 collisions are of interest. Eleven occurred in dark-
ness and two in daylight hours. Applying the same hypo-
theses as before, it is seen that the probability of two
or less daylight collisions occurring under the null hypo-
thesis is .011. Again the null hypothesis is rejected
with high confidence.
From the results of the preceding txvo tests it can
be inferred that the probability of being involved in
a collision is higher during the hours of darkness than
17
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during the hours of daylight. This may seem intuitive,
but it might also seem reasonable to assume that the
decreased tempo of shipboard routine, to which the Officer-
of-the-Deck often unwisely devotes an inordinate amount
of time, and the condition of darkness itself would both
tend to increase the vigilance of the Officer-of-the-Deck
and hence his performance. This is apparently not so.
4 . Commanding Officer's Absence from the Bridge
It might seem plausible that a significant causal
factor in collisions could be a reluctance by the Officer-
of-the-Deck to seek the guidance of his Commanding Officer
in a deteriorating situation in which the watch officer
either takes a poorly judged action or, what is often
worse, fails to act at all. The failure to inform the
Commanding Officer is invariably a violation of both
Navy Regulations and the Captain's standing night orders.
In the 22 collisions in the data base there are
four instances of the Captain either being off the bridge,
completely ignorant of the development of a dangerous
situation, or, upon being alerted, arriving on the bridge
too late to take responsible corrective action. As these
incidents were all at night the Of f icer-of-the-Deck might
have been ill-motivated by a desire not to disturb the
sleep (often a precious commodity) of his Commanding Officer
In one instance, the Commanding Officer, although advised
by his watch officer of a deteriorating situation, failed
to take any action whatsoever.
18

It is instructive to note that three of these four
incidents involved a violation of the rules of the road by
the other vessel involved in the collision. One might
speculate that although these watch officers, or at least
three of them, might perform competently in a normal
environment, they failed in a situation confounded by the
improper action of other vessels.
Since the failure to summon the Commanding Officer
or the failure of the Commanding Officer to respond to
his watch officer's summons occurred in 191 of the total
incidents, one may state that this particular failing had
nothing to do with 81% of the collisions. In the collisions
in which the Commanding Officers were unable to or chose
not to aid their watch officers the principal faults of
their vessels were all the failure to meet the responsi-
bilities of the burdened vessel.
It seems probable that had the three aforementioned
Captains been advised in a timely fashion of a potentially
hazardous situation, they would have taken action to
prevent collision. The fourth captain, although possibly
extremely fatigued, failed to discharge his responsibili-
ties as Commanding Officer.
Thus while each of these four collisions had an
immediate cause, if watch officers had advised their
Commanding Officers as they were legally bound to do, or,
in the one instance, had the Captain responded to his
watch officer's call, then it is possible that the data
19

base would consist of 18 collisions instead of 22. It
may be concluded that the failure of Commanding Officers
to advise their watch officers in hazardous situations
through their own fault, or more likely, through the fault
of the watch officers themselves contributed to a signifi-
cant number of collisions.
5. Shipboard Organization
A possible contributing factor to collision is the
unsatisfactory performance of different segments of the
shipboard organization. Inadequate performances by a
bridge watch (other than the 00D) , Combat Information
Center (CIC) , navigation detail, low visibility detail,
or the main propulsion watch could all increase the
probability of collision.
Although bridge watches were found to be ill-
trained in three incidents, and the low visibility detail
was found wanting in two incidents, these shortcomings had
little to do with the collisions which befell the vessels.
This is not to say that a bumbling bridge watch or special
detail could not be responsible for collision. They
simply were not responsible for any of the particular
22 collisions in the data base.
An inadequate performance by a poorly trained
Combat Information Center figured in 11 of the collisions.
Prior to five of these collisions CIC gave absolutely no
recommendations to the Of ficer-of- the-Deck. In three of
these five incidents no surface plot was maintained in CIC
20

In six of the cases the recommendations which did emerge
from CIC were adjudged to be untimely or of poor quality
or both. In one of these six cases no surface plot was
maintained in CIC. To make a recommendation to the conn
without the aid of a surface plot takes a supremely
confident CIC watch officer.
If the CIC's involved in the 11 aforementioned
collisions had performed satisfactorily, it is possible
that a number of these collisions could have been avoided.
Radar has greatly enhanced the ability of watch officers
to perceive correctly the exact circumstances associated
with their vessel's movement. It is one of CIC's primary
missions to utilize this tool to the benefit of the 00D.
The fact that the Combat Information Center failed
to perform adequately in 50% of the collisions in the data
base is highly significant. Since, hopefully, 501 of
naval vessels do not have CIC's which are as poor as those
faulted in the data base, it is asserted that a poorly
trained CIC will increase a vessel's probability of
collision.
6. Weather (Other than Fog)
With the significant exception of reduced visibility
due to fog, weather was not a factor in any of the collisions
in the data base. That is to say, high winds or a tempes-
tuous sea in no instance reduced a vessel's maneuverability
or state of vigilance in such a manner as to contribute to
collision.
21

7. Fog
Nine of the 22 collisions in the data base occurred
in an environment in which visibility had been significantly-
reduced by fog. Thus, while 411 of the collisions occurred
in conditions of markedly reduced visibility, certainly the
percentage of steaming hours United States naval vessels
spend in fog does not approach this high figure. From
this one may reasonably infer that the probability of
collision, even in this age of radar, increases in fog.
While this may seem intuitive, it might also seem intuitive
to some that fog would increase a watch officer's vigilance
and in turn reduce the probability of collision.
From Table I it is seen that there are nine inci-
dents in which fog significantly reduced visibility. In
eight of these instances the naval vessel involved was
adjudged to be proceeding at an immoderate speed. In the
ninth incident the other vessel was guilty of traveling at
an excessive speed, and the major fault of the naval vessel
lay in taking improper actions in extremis. In each colli-
sion occurring in low visibility at least one of the vessels
involved was traveling at an immoderate speed, and in four
instances both vessels were guilty of this offense.
Clearly there is a significant correlation between the
occurrence of low-visibility conditions and the violation
of Rule 16(a) of the International Nautical Rules of the
Road. Rule 16(a) states: "Every vessel ... shall , in fog,
mist, falling snow,... or any other condition. .. res tricting
22

visibility, go at a moderate speed..." "Moderate speed"
has been interpreted by the courts as being that speed
which would enable a vessel to stop within half the visible
distance
.
To illustrate the certitude of the preceding argument
one may perform a binomial test on the data.
Null hypothesis: The probability of a vessel
proceeding at an immoderate speed in reduced visibility
when she is involved in a collision is one half.
Alternate hypothesis: The probability of a vessel
proceeding at an immoderate speed in reduced visibility
when she is involved in a collision is greater than one
half.
Sample size is nine. The number of collisions
in which the vessel of interest is not proceeding at an
immoderate speed equals one.
Under the null hypothesis the probability of
observing a value as small as one for the number of vessels
not traveling at an excessive speed is .020.
Thus it may be stated that fog increases the
probability of collision. With a high degree of confidence
it may be stated that ships having collisions during periods
of low visibility are much more likely to be traveling at
an immoderate speed than not.
23

8. Failure of Other Vessel to Adhere to the Rules of
the Road
The failure of the vessel met by a U.S. naval
vessel to adhere to the rules of the road was a significant
causal factor in nine of the 22 incidents in the data
base. In one of these incidents the vessel encountered
failed to perform satisfactorily in a meeting situation,
two ships were guilty of proceeding at an immoderate speed
in fog (one of which was not sounding fog signals) , two
vessels failed to meet the responsibilities of the privi-
leged vessel, and four vessels failed to meet the responsi-
bilities of the burdened vessel. Two of these burdened
vessels had no lookouts posted and were unaware of the
approach of the naval vessel until extremis.
Certainly the rule violations of these vessels
contributed in large measure to the resultant collisions.
Indeed, in most of these cases these violations were of
paramount significance. Yet this is not to say that,
if a vessel is encountered on the high seas and she
operates in violation of the rules of the road, that one
cannot avoid colliding with her. A case in point comes
from the data base. In unlimited visibility, during the
day, a destroyer encountered a solitary small fishing
vessel in a crossing situation. The destroyer was privi-
leged and maintained course and speed until she collided
with the fishing vessel, which was incidentally operating
24

without a lookout. Although the fishing vessel was clearly
at fault, this collision could probably have been avoided
by the destroyer's action.
The high incidence of, and the nature of the rule
violations committed by vessels encountered at sea places
this factor high on the list of collision causal factors.
9. Violation of the Nautical Rules of the Road by
United States Naval Vessels
In 21 of the 22 collisions in the data base the
U.S. naval vessel involved violated at least one of the
Rules of the Road. While some of the violations were
minor and did not significantly contribute to collision,
others were largely responsible for collision.
The gross violations of the Rules of the Road by
eight of the nine vessels which experienced collisions in
fog have been discussed already. All of these vessels
were transiting at an immoderate speed, while some of
them were guilty of not sounding fog signals, not posting
special low-visibility lookouts, and responding incorrectly
upon hearing an uncorrelated fog signal forward of the beam.
In seven of the collisions in the data base the
U.S. naval vessel failed to carry out the responsibilities
of the burdened vessel. These incidents represent the
gravest type of violation.
In 15 collisions the ship's whistle was either not
employed when required, or, if utilized, employed incorrectly
25

In three instances U.S. naval vessels were privileged when
it appeared that the burdened vessel was taking no action
to avoid collision. These naval vessels maintained course
and speed until in extremis and, emergency maneuvers
failing, suffered collisions. Not once either before or
during extremis did any of these ships utilize their whistles
The danger signal should certainly have been used to alert
the other vessels to the dangers of collision. As it was
later ascertained that in two of these collisions no
lookouts were posted on the burdened vessels, it seems
probable that the timely sounding of the danger signal
would have alerted someone on the burdened vessels. Other
violations of the Rules of the Road concerning sound
signals which are recorded in the data base include the
failure to sound fog signals when required, incorrect
whistle signals, and the failure to sound signals upon
turning and backing.
The aforementioned violations of the Rules of the
Road figure in varying degrees in 95% of the collisions
under study, and contributed in large measure to 821 of
them. The violation of the Nautical Rules of the Road is
a highly significant causal factor of collisions.
10 . Concomitant Factors
It was of interest to investigate those causal
factors which occurred simultaneously with a marked regu-
larity. To this end Table II was constructed. The
26

entries of this table represent the number of simultaneous
occurrences of the factors listed on the horizontal and
vertical axes. Given the total number of occurrences of
a given causal factor one can then compute the percentage
of incidents in which, if a given factor occurred, it was
accompanied by another factor. It was hoped some unsus-
pected relationship between certain of the factors might
be revealed.
Many of the inferences made from Table II are
simplistic. As one would suspect, it can be seen that,
whenever a vessel was adjudged of proceeding at an
immoderate speed in fog, conditions of low visibility
existed. Also, whenever CIC was cited as performing un-
satisfactorily it was also deemed to be inadequately
trained. Aside from such trivial examples some more
interesting pairings are delineated. For example, in
those incidents in which naval vessels were adjudged to
be guilty of proceeding at an immoderate speed in fog
75% of the vessels also improperly utilized their sound
signals. It was also revealed that, when the vessel met
by the naval vessel failed to meet the responsibilities of
the privileged or burdened vessel, in 78% of the instances
the naval vessel improperly utilized her sound signals.
Basically, however, no evidence of unsuspected
relationships between causal factors was discovered by this
technique. Nevertheless this fact in itself is of some
interest.
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TABLE II: SIMULTANEOUS OCCURRENCE OF FACTORS
CAUSAL FACTORS
I II III IV V VI
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a 6 7 10 5 13 l l l - - 8 3 8 2 2 - - l - - 7 5 4 2 5
b - 1 1 - 1 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 -
c 6 9 13 4 13 l l l - - 11 3 11 2 2 - - l - - 7 6 3 2 8
d 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 - 1 - 1
e 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - 1
f
g
h 5 6 8 - 8 1 11 l - - 2 11 1 2 5pi 2 2 ,fi
1—
1
1—
a - 1 2 - 3 3 - - - - 2 2 2 - 1 1
b 3 6 8 3 8 1 JJ i 1 - - 11 1 2 - — S 4 ?
r
—
C Tj l l 2 2 _ X _ - i - 1 - - -1 - i
d 2 - 2 1 2 - 2 1 1 - - 2 - 2 1 - - - - - 2 - 1 - 2 Pi(^
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e
£
>
t—1 a 1 - - 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - -
>
a
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c 8 2 7 4 7 - 7 l 1 - - 5 2 5 2 2 - - l - - 2 5 - 6 pq
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>
a 2 3 6 1 5 l 6 - - - - 4 2 4 2 _ -
b 4 1 4 2 4 - 3 l - - - 2 - 2 1 1 5 1 - 3
c - 2 1 - 2 1 2 - - - - 2 1 2 1 - 1
d 5 5 7 2 5 - 8 1 1 - - 6 1 6 2 2 6 1 3 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCu RREi\ CES OF INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
8 iob 5 15 l 18 l 1 LI 3 11 2 2 - - l - - 9 9 5 2 8
The entries represent the number of times the
factors listed on the horizontal and vertical axes
occurred simultaneously.
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IV. RULES OF THE ROAD TEST
A. RATIONALE
From the study of the incidents in the data base it
is seen that in almost every instance the naval vessel
under study failed in varying degrees to adhere to the
Rules of the Road. In 82% of the collisions the vessel
collided with also failed in some manner to abide by the
rules.
Since the violation of the Rules of the Road does
figure so prominently in collision after collision, one
might reasonably hypothesize that United States Navy watch
officers are deficient in their knowledge of these nautical
rules. To test this hypothesis, a Rules of the Road test
was administered to 14 students at the Naval Postgraduate
School who had all previously been qualified as and stood
watches as Officers-of- the-Deck . The selection of these
individuals to the Postgraduate School implies that these
officers were superior performers during their prior tours
of sea duty.
Eight scenario- type questions were constructed. Each
question was to test the respondent's knowledge of a par-
ticular segment of the rules. Since the responses were
graded in a subjective manner, an effort was made to give
a respondent the benefit of the doubt, if by the wording
or vagueness of his response, it was not clear whether he
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understood the substance and application of the particular
rule(s) in question.
The areas of interest which were covered by the
questions were: duties and responsibilities of the privi-
leged and burdened vessel, procedures for proceeding in
low visibility, meeting vessels encumbered with tows,
cross-signals, proper procedures for overtaking and meeting
vessels (inland and international), and special operations.
Some questions, due to their scenario framework, required
a knowledge of a number of the areas. None of the questions
dealt with what might be considered esoteric concepts of
the minutia associated with the rules and no question
required knowledge of any particular signal, light display,
etc., which one might claim required special memorization
and, if a respondent were indeed at sea, he would have
"brushed up" on.
Instead the questions dealt with broad concepts and
the most rudimentary knowledge of signaling (i.e.., in
international waters one short blast means, "My rudder is
right.") Although the respondent could, and some did,
answer his questionnaire in careful detail, it was not
necessary for an individual to do so for him to show an
understanding of the basic concepts involved in the
questions
.
The respondents were asked to complete their question-
naires in one sitting without reference to any material
either before or during the period of testing. The concepts
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to be tested were, in the author's opinion, so crucial
to the proper performance of the duties of the 00D that
any individual who was trained at the Naval Academy, Officer
Candidate School, or in NROTC , and then subsequently quali-
fied as an Of ficer-of- the-Deck should have a good untutored
working knowledge of them, even though the individual had
not been to sea for several years. Therefore, in order not
to bias results upward, the condition of no reference was
applied to the test. It is believed that 1001 of the
respondents adhered to the conditions of the test.
B. RESULTS
The following results were obtained by question:
Concept Tested by Question
Question 1: Recognition of duties of privileged and
burdened vessels
.
Question 2
Question 3
Question 4
Question 5
Question 6
Question 7
Proceeding in low visibility.
Meeting a vessel end-on.
Meeting a vessel end-on in low visibility
with associated concepts of privileged and
burdened vessels.
Meeting a tug and tow.
Recognition of "cross-signals."
Recognition of "cross-signals" and proper
procedure for overtaking vessels in inland
waters
.
Question 8: Special operations.
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The results obtained for each question were:
Question 1: Four of 14 respondents did not indicate that
they would have properly carried out the
responsibilities incident to the privileged
vessel
.
Question 2: Two of 14 respondents, upon hypothetically
entering thick fog (visibility 300 yards),
did not slow to a speed that approached a
moderate one. Three respondents did not,
upon hypothetically hearing an uncorrelated
fog signal forward of their beam, stop their
engines and proceed with caution.
As the scenario of this question matured
all respondents were placed in extremis.
One officer wrote that upon backing he would
sound three prolonged blasts (vice three
short, of course). This singular gaffe
could indicate an ignorance of one of the
most rudimentary of nautical rules.
Another respondent did not appear to be
cognizant of the fact that, if a contact
whose speed was 10 knots emerged from fog
300 yards away from him on a collision course,
he was indeed in extremis. His response that
"slow... and pass astern" of the contact seems
to be the acme of optimism.
Question 3: Two respondents upon meeting a contact ahead
on a reciprocal course which had shown a
small, but steady, left bearing drift,
chose to come left and attempt a starboard-
to-starboard passage. This action in viola-
tion of the Rules of the Road would certainly
increase the probability of collision.
Question 4: Eight of 14 responses indicated that the
respondents did not realize that vessels "not
in sight of one another are neither privileged
nor burdened."
Question 5: Eight of 14 respondents thought that a tug.
with tow automatically becomes the privileged
vessel. While the prudent watch officer will
exercise great care while maneuvering in the
vicinity of vessels encumbered with tows,
such vessels do not automatically become
privileged in each and every meeting situation
Indeed the responsibilities of the privileged
vessel can often be more embarrassing to a
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vessel encumbered with tow than the
responsibilities attendant on the
burdened vessel
.
Question 6: Four of 14 officers were not conscious of the
illegality of "cross-signals" in inland
waters. One of these four did not know the
meaning of one and two short blasts as
utilized in inland waters. This was one of
the grosser errors in a questionnaire which
contained major errors in seven of eight
questions
.
Question 7: This question elicited the largest number
of poor responses. Here one had to be
familiar with the correct procedure to
overtake a vessel in inland waters. Eight of
14 respondents did not recognize the illegality
of "cross-signals" in the overtaking situation.
Seven of these respondents evidenced a basic
ignorance of the proper procedure to be
utilized to overtake a vessel. Two officers
did not know the meaning of one or two short
blasts
.
Question 8: Six respondents were not aware of the fact
that according to Rule 4(f) of the International
Rules of the Road that vessels engaged in
special operations become privileged.
A graphic and tabular display of test results versus
years of sea duty follows
:
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CORRECT RESPONSES VERSUS YEARS OF SEA DUTY
Number of
Correct
Responses
8
7 "
6 •
5
"
4 •
3 '
2
1
©
- O ©
o
O = Individual Score
6 7
Years of Sea Duty
£) = Mean Score for all those with
same number of years of sea duty
An overall upward trend of scores with additional years
of sea duty is apparently evidenced above.
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MEAN SCORES FOR VARYING YEARS OF SEA DUTY
Mean scores for groups of officers with varying years
of sea duty are tabulated below. It can be seen that a
better test would have resulted if more officers from each
end of the experience scale had been tested.
TABLE III
Years of
Sea Duty 2 2.5 3 4 5 5.5 6
Mean Score 3 7 4 4.3 5 6 5
Number of
Officers with
Respective Years
of Sea Dutv
1 1 4 3 3 1 1
Overall mean number of years sea duty = 3.93
Overall mean score (number of correct responses) = 4.64
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It is of interest at this time .to digress somewhat
from the thrust of the work and examine the test results
in some detail. It might be valuable to see whether
officers' knowledge of the Rules of the Road increases
with additional sea duty.
A nonparametric examination of this question, utilizing
Fisher's exact probability test, is contained in Appendix B.
This examination reveals an apparent upward trend of scores
with increased years of sea duty. It does seem intuitive
that one's knowledge of the rules of the road would increase
with additional years spent at sea.
C. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM RESULTS OF RULES OF THE ROAD
EXAMINATION
The scores achieved on the Rules of the Road examination
were low. From the group of 14 qualified Of ficers-of -the-
Deck, with a mean number of years at sea of 3.93, a mean
score of 4.64 correct responses out of eight questions was
obtained. Fifty per cent of the naval officers missed at
least 501 of the questions. Considering the simplistic
nature of the questions, the resultant mean score is far
below what might have been expected from a group of pro-
fessional naval officers. The nature of the errors often
displayed a lack of knowledge of the most rudimentary
concepts of the nautical Rules of the Road. Among the
errors found in the responses were: imprudent and incorrect
procedures in fog, the lack of knowledge concerning the
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procedures to be utilized upon overtaking and meeting
vessels in inland waters (in particular the inability to
recognize the illegality of "cross-signals"), and the lack
of knowledge of the meaning of the simplest of whistle
signals. These errors, if committed on the bridge, could
well enhance a ship's probability of suffering collision.
If the results of the examination faithfully reflect
the professional expertise of the typical United States
naval officer, then it is no surprise that 95% of the
vessels in the data base violated the Rules of the Road
in such a manner as to contribute to collision. If a much
smaller percentage of respondents had scored poorly on the
examination, it would have still been a cause for alarm.
If only 10% of the Navy's watch officers have an insufficieni
knowledge of the Rules of the Road, one could surmise that
the watch officer qualification process is functioning
improperly. This statistic, as reflected by the results of
the examination, could be well over 101.
The results of the testing indicate that some Officers-
of-the-Deck are inadequately qualified to stand watch. One
must, however, temper this judgment by recalling that the
test was conducted in an unrealistic environment by a
relatively small number of officers who had not been at sea
for some time.
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V. REVIEW OF COLLISION CAUSAL FACTORS
The following causal factors and their associated
culpability have been scrutinized:
(1) Material failure is not a significant cause of the
type of collision studied in this work.
(2) Off icer-of- the-Deck fatigue is not a significant
cause of collision.
(3) Time of day does affect the probability of collision.
Collisions are more apt to occur in hours of darkness
than in hours of light.
C4) The absence of the Commanding Officer from the bridge
can enhance the probability of collision. The failure of
the Of ficer-of- the-Deck to inform the Captain of a deteri-
orating situation is generally the cause of this absence.
(5) The failure of Combat Information Center to function
satisfactorily as an aid to the Of ficer-of -the-Deck
contributes to significant numbers of collisions. This
is especially true at night and in conditions of low
visibility.
(6) Foul weather conditions (other than fog) are not a
significant cause of collision.
(7) Imprudent action and improper procedure in fog
are significant causes of collision.
(8) The failure of vessels met on the high seas to
adhere to the Rules of the Road contributes to signifi-
cant numbers of collisions.
(9) The violation of the nautical Rules of the Road by
U.S. naval vessels contributes, in varying degrees, to
almost every collision they suffer. Some naval officers
appear to have an inadequate knowledge of the nautical
Rules of the Road.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The vast majority of collisions suffered by United
States naval vessels could have been avoided if Officers-
of-the-Deck and, in some cases, their Commanding Officers
had fulfilled their duties in a competent, professional
manner. Both an imprudent disregard for, and an ignorance
of, the nautical Rules of the Road figure heavily in many
collisions. A Rules of the Road examination administered
to qualified Of ficers-of
-
the-Deck indicates that there is
a serious ignorance concerning the basic precepts of the
rules on the part of some naval officers.
In many of the naval ships involved in collision the
Combat Information Center functioned poorly as an aid to
the ship's conn. The Captain, Officer-of- the-Deck , and
other personnel associated directly with the Combat Infor-
mation Center all are, in varying degrees, responsible for
this shortcoming.
Factors such as fog, night time steaming, and the
failure of vessels met to adhere to the Rules of the Road
all heighten the probability of collision. Yet these
factors in themselves do not cause collisions. It is the
inadequate response to these conditions by the ship's
personnel that causes the collisions.
To prevent the costly collisions of the future, the
navy must ensure that its watch officers are ever mindful
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of their duties and responsibilities under Naval
Regulations and the nautical Rules of the Road. On most
of the vessels scrutinized in this study, personnel in key
positions were either ill-trained or negligent in the per-
formance of their duties. The Rules of the Road examination
indicates that some of the navy's watch officers are ill-
trained.
The results of this study indicate that the navy should
scrutinize its Officer-of- the-Deck qualification program.
Perhaps the instruction received at officer training insti-
tutions and the mode of shipboard training and qualifica-
tion should be scrutinized with an eye to change. Perhaps
an annual proficiency examination similar to the naval
aviator's NATOPS examination would be in order, or tests
such as the Merchant Marine's mate qualification examinations
might be instituted. A detailed study of these alternatives
is beyond the scope of this thesis. The surest way, how-
ever, to prevent the collisions of tomorrow is to initiate
higher standards of professional competence for the officer
corps today.
40

APPENDIX A
CHI -SQUARE TEST CONCERNING FATIGUE
OF OFFICER-OF-THE-DECK
From the data base the following table was constructed
Hours on watch
for OOD 1 2 3 4 and over
Number of collisions
in corresponding
hour of watch
7 5 5 3
The above table is suspect in that several of the
"time-on-deck" statistics were conjectures from the incident
reports, and thus represent "best guesses" rather than
figures that can be accepted with certitude.
To test the null hypothesis the Chi-Square one-sample
test is utilized.
2 _
4 (0, E.)
E •
i=l E.l
, degrees of freedom = 3
where
f-V»
0. = Observed number of collisions in i— hour,
E. = Expected number of collisions in i— hour
under null hypothesis,
E i
= 22/4 , i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Hence x
2 =
.545.
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From Table C, Appendix I, of Fisher we see that if the
null hypothesis is true, then a Chi-Square statistic equal
to or less than .545 has a probability of occurrence of at
least .90. Hence the null hypothesis is not rejected.
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APPENDIX B
A NONPARAMETRIC EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER KNOWLEDGE OF THE RULES OF THE ROAD
INCREASES WITH ADDITIONAL YEARS OF SEA DUTY
Page 44 shows a tabulation of each respondent's score
and years of sea duty, and page 45 contains a Fisher Exact
Probability Test contingency table.
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The Fisher Exactly Probability Test is a nonparametric
technique used to analyze discrete data when data points
(scores here) are from two independent samples which are
small in size. These scores must fall into one of two
mutually exclusive categories.
The null hypothesis is that the scores from Groups I
and II do not differ significantly in the proportion with
which they fall above or below the overall mean score.
Group I consists of individuals with from two to three
years of sea duty, and Group II of individuals with from
four to six years of sea duty.
The probability of obtaining test results under the null
hypothesis as extreme or more extreme than the observed
outcomes is .296. Using Tocher's modification the proba-
bility of cases more extreme than the observed one is
utilized. This probability is .051. If a confidence
level of a = .1 is used, the following ratio is obtained:
a - .051 .1 - .051
?
.245 .245 ' ' L
where .245 is the probability under the null hypothesis of
the occurrence of the observed outcome.
A table of uniform random numbers (0 to 1) was utilized
to obtain a random number. If the number drawn had been
less than .2 the null hypothesis could have been rejected.
Since .36063 was drawn the null hypothesis cannot be
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rejected at a = .1 even though Toche.r's modification makes
the Fisher Exact Probability Test less conservative.
Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis at our selected
level of confidence (a = .1) that there is no significant
difference in the scores attained on the Rules of the Road
test by the groups of officers with different levels of
experience. There is, however, an apparent upward trend
of scores with increased years of sea duty. It seems
intuitive that, in most cases, one's knowledge of the
Rules of the Road increases with additional years spent at
sea.
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